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ANTITRUST LAWS-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-HARM TO COMPETI-
TION-MEETING COMPETITION DEFENSE- The United States Su-
preme Court has held that the inference of a reasonable possibility
of competitive injury required by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act is permissible in the absence of large buyer preference
and seller predation, and section 2(b) of the act neither distin-
guishes between meeting competition to retain a customer and
meeting competition to gain new customers nor requires a seller to
set its lower prices on a customer-by-customer basis.
Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282
(1983).
Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to distributors from its Lou-
isville, Kentucky brewery.' From July 1, 1972, through November
30, 1978, it sold beer in thirteen states, including Indiana and Ken-
tucky.2 Vanco Beverage, Inc. was the only wholesale distributor of
Falls City Beer in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, and Dawson
Springs, Inc. was its only wholesale distributor in Henderson
County, Kentucky. Considered part of a single metropolitan area,
the two counties contain the cities of Evansville, Indiana and Hen-
derson, Kentucky, which are less than ten miles apart and linked
by an interstate highway.8
Although Vanco and Dawson Springs were located in the same
metropolitan area and purchased beer from the same brewers, in-
cluding Falls City, they did not compete for sales to retailers.4
Vanco and other Indiana wholesalers were precluded from selling
to out-of-state retailers by Indiana law;' Indiana law also prohib-
ited retailers from buying beer from out-of-state wholesalers, such
as Dawson Springs.6 Additionally, Indiana law required Falls City
and other brewers to sell beer at the same price to all wholesalers
within the state,' and it forbade importation of alcoholic beverages
by consumers without a permit.8
1. Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
2. Id. at 1287.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. See IND. CODE § 7.1-3-3-5 (1982).
6. 103 S. Ct. at 1287. See IND. CODE § 7.1-3-4-6 (1982).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 1287. See IND. CODE § 7.1-5-5-7 (1982).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 1287. See IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1 (1982). This law was ignored and
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Vanco filed suit against Falls City in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana in December, 1976.' In
its complaint, Vanco alleged Falls City charged it a higher price
than Dawson Springs, thereby discriminating in price in violation
of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act. 0 Vanco also alleged Falls City conspired with other
wholesalers and brewers to maintain higher prices in Indiana than
in Kentucky in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 1
Falls City responded by raising the meeting competition defense
provided by section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.
1 2
After trial, the district court dismissed the conspiracy and mo-
nopolization claims against Falls City, finding no evidence to sup-
port them.1 3 Nevertheless, Vanco succeeded in making out a prima
facie case of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman
Act.14 Futhermore, the meeting competition defense proffered by
largely unenforced. 103 S. Ct. at 1287.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 1287.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 13(a) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them ....
103 S. Ct. at 1287 n.2.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). Section 13(b) provides in relevant part:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus
made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
Id.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 1287. See Vanco Beverage, Inc. v. Falls City Industries, Inc., 1980-82
Trade Cases (CCH) 63,357 at 75,809 (S.D. Ind. April 14, 1980), afl'd, 654 F.2d 1224 (7th
Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
14. 103 S. Ct. at 1287. Specifically, the district court found that within a geographic
market that included Vanderburgh and Henderson Counties, Falls City charged Indiana
distributors 10-30% more than it charged Kentucky distributors - a price differential un-
explained by cost differences. Because Kentucky distributors, including Dawson Springs,
could pass savings on to retailers, who in turn passed savings on to consumer, the district
court found Vanco and Dawson Springs competed for sale of Falls City beer to consumers,
including Indiana customers who ignored state law and purchased less expensive Falls City
beer in Henderson County, Kentucky. Id. at 1287-88.
Although the district court noted a nationwide trend that favored national beer brands
and a precipitous drop in the sale of Falls City beer in both Indiana and Kentucky, it found
208
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Falls City was rejected by the district court. 15 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding of liability by a divided vote." Falls City then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari to review the
court of appeals' holding.
1 7
At the outset, Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous court,
reaffirmed the rule that the prophylactic purpose of section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act "does not 'require that the discrimina-
tions must in fact have harmed competition.' "18 Noting the phrase
"reasonable possibility of harm" is used interchangeably with
"competitive injury," Justice Blackmun concluded that injunctive
relief and inquiry into plaintiff's entitlement to treble damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act'9 are warranted when there is a
showing of competitive harm. 0
Justice Blackmun next discussed Falls City's contention that the
court of appeals' reliance on FTC v. Morton Salt Co. 2 1 to uphold
the district court's finding of competitive injury was unfounded.22
In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court permitted the inference of a
that Vanco's sales of Falls City declined more rapidly than those of other distributors in
Indiana and Henderson County, where the drop in sales of Falls City was less than that in
Kentucky as a whole. The district court attributed Vanco's inability to compete effectively
with Dawson Springs to Falls City's pricing policies, which policies also caused Vanco to sell
less beer to distributors. Id. at 1288 n.4.
15. Id. at 1288. The district court concluded that Falls City did not adjust its prices on
a customer-by-customer basis. By charging a single price through each state in which it sold
beer and by raising its Indiana prices to wholesalers more than it raised its Kentucky prices,
Falls City created the price disparity. The district court found that the higher Indiana
prices were due to Falls City following the other brewers to increase profits, thereby pre-
cluding a finding of food faith. Id.
16. Id. See Vanco Beverage, Inc. v. Falls City Industries, Inc., 654 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir.
1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
17. Id. See 445 U.S. 988 (1982).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 1288. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557,
562 (1981), (quoting Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 at 742 (1945)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 15 provides in relevant part: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor . . .and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
20. 103 S. Ct. at 1288-89.
21. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 1289. According to Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court in FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), held that the competitive injury requirement of § 2(a)
was established by proof of "a substantial price discrimination between competing purchas-
ers over time." 103 S. Ct. at 1289. Justice Blackmun further observed that an inference of
competitive injury, absent direct evidence of displaced sales, may be overcome by evidence
breaking the causative link between lost profits or sales and a price differential. Id. See
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1982); F. RowE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 182 (1962).
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reasonable possibility of harm to competition from price discrimi-
nation between competing purchasers.23 Justice Blackmun rejected
Falls City's argument that the Morton Salt rule should not be in-
volved except in cases where there is predation by the seller or
large buyer preference.2 Since Falls City offered no economic rea-
son why the so called self-evident inference of Morton Salt25
should not be applied where the favored competitor is small or me-
dium-sized, the Court concluded that the court of appeals' reliance
was justified.2 6
Justice Blackmun conceded that, in a strictly literal sense, the
Morton Salt case was different from the instant case because there
was no competition between Vanco and Dawson Springs at the
wholesale level and because sales to retailers by Vanco and Dawson
Springs occurred only within their respective states.27 However,
Justice Blackmun observed that Falls City was not challenging the
district court's finding'that the retailers were selling in a single,
interstate retail market and stated that the competitive injury
component of a Robinson-Patman case includes injury to competi-
tion between retailers as well as injury to competition between fa-
vored and disfavored wholesalers. 28 Given the significant price dif-
ference between Vanco and Dawson Springs over an extended
23. 334 U.S. at 50.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 1289.
25. In Morton Salt, Justice Black, writing for the majority, characterized as self-evi-
dent "a 'reasonable possibility' that competition may be adversely affected by a practice
under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers substantially
cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers." 334 U.S. at 50.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1289. Conceding that Congress' concerns about inordinate market
power of large purchasers engendered the Robinson-Patman Act, Justice Blackmun quoted
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 522 (1963), to the effect that the Act "is of general appli-
cation and prohibits discrimination generally." 103 S. Ct. at 1289. He determined that any
alteration in the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act must be made by Congress, not by the
Supreme Court. Id. See ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, The Robinson-Patman
Act: Policy and Law, Vol. 1, 102-03 (1980); United States Department of Justice, Report on
the Robinson-Patman Act, 101-39, 221-28 and 290-91 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Report].
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1289. In Morton Salt, the manufacturer sold different brands of table
salt directly to wholesalers or jobbers, who in turn resold to the retail trade and large retail-
ers, including chain store retailers. 334 U.S. at 40-41.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 1289. Justice Blackmun noted that the district court's findings that
the sale of Falls City beer to Vanco was in interstate commerce and that Henderson and
Vanderburgh counties were a single retail market for beer were upheld by the court of ap-
peals. Further, he reiterated that Falls City never argued that Evansville and Henderson
were separate retail markets and that the court of appeals' holding was justified because of
Indiana's consumer level nonimportation law. He specifically stated that the broader ques-
tion as to whether Indiana and Kentucky constituted separate markets was not before the
Court. Id. at 1289 n.7.
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period of time, he concluded that Falls City was responsible for
Vanco's injury to the extent it was attributable to price discrimina-
tion, notwithstanding evidence that some or even most of Vanco's
lost sales of Falls City beer were attributable to other factors, espe-
cially the market-wide decline of Falls City beer. 9 Futhermore, the
direct evidence of diverted sales unquestionably established that
Vanco had made out a prima facie case under section 2(a), accord-
ing to Justice Blackmun.30
Justice Blackmun then addressed Falls City's meeting competi-
tion defense, emphasizing that the burden was upon the seller to
prove that it was reasonable for the seller to believe that its quoted
price or a lower one was available to favored purchasers from its
competitors in order to preclude liability."1 He determined that
neither the district court nor the court of appeals focused on the
critical issue: whether Falls City demonstrated it had information
that would have led it to believe that ite lower Kentucky price
would meet competitors' equally low prices there.
32
Justice Blackmun then outlined the court of appeals' rationale
for finding Falls City had failed to establish the meeting competi-
tion defense as a prelude to undertaking an analysis of section 2(b)
29. Id. at 1290. Justice Blackmun approved the position of the district court and the
court of appeals that higher prices charged Indiana distributors and lower retail prices in
Henderson County, which attracted Indiana customers away from Indiana retailers leading
to the decline of purchases from Vanco, were the predominant reason for higher Indiana
retail beer prices. See Vanco Beverage, Inc. v. Falls City Industries, Inc., 654 F.2d 1224,
1229 (7th Cir. 1981). He relied on Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., concurring), wherein the Court concluded that under § 4 of
the Clayton Act, "[t]he plaintiff need not show that the illegality was a more substantial
cause than any other."
30. 103 S. Ct. at 1290. Referring to the trial and appeal transcripts, Justice Blackmun
cited the following as direct evidence of diverted sales: (1) testimony by Falls City's own
sales agent that the different prices charged in the two states at least partially explained the
difference in Vanco's and Dawson Springs' sales performance; (2) reports by the local press
of substantial beer purchases by Indiana residents in Kentucky; (3) extensive advertisement
of low prices and "drive-in windows" by Kentucky retailers located on the Evansville-Hen-
derson highway just south of the Indiana state line; (4) testimony of witnesses who observed
cars with Indiana license plates parked at Henderson County retailers and their drivers
returning to them with cases of beer; and (5) testimony by an Indiana resident that he
bought beer in Kentucky because he could get a better price for it there. Id.
31. Id. at 1290. See supra note 12. Justice Blackmun observed that Supreme Court
decisions consistently provide that the meeting competition defense "'at least requires the
seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the existence of facts which would
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in
fact meet the equally low price of a competitor."' United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978) (quoting FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60
(1945)). See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 (1979).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 1290.
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of the Robinson-Patman Act." Facially, according to Justice
Blackmun, section 2(b) requires that the lower price be made in
good faith to meet the competitor's low price - a requirement
that involves more than a showing of facts that would lead a rea-
sonable person to believe a lower price was available to a favored
purchaser from a competitor.3 4 He determined that the seller's of-
fer of a lower price must be made in good faith and for the pur-
pose of meeting the competitor's price. 5
Elaborating on the standard that applies to the requirement of a
good faith response, Justice Blackmun stressed that the "prudent
person" standard adopted by the court in FTC v. A. E. Staley
Manufacturing Co." does not depend on abstract theories but on
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.37 He then indi-
cated the facts and circumstances involving Falls City Industries
33. Id. According to Justice Blackmun, the court of appeals considered a showing that
(1) the price difference resulted from Indiana price increases as opposed to Kentucky price
decreases and (2) the higher Indiana price resulted from Falls City's profit maximizing prac-
tice of following the Indiana prices of its larger competitors as sufficient to defeat the de-
fense. Id. at 1290-91. He further observed that the court of appeals believed FTC v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co. supported its holding that Falls City's defense failed because instead of
responding to individual situations, it adopted a "general system of competition." Id. at
1291. See 654 F.2d at 1230.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 1291. See supra note 12.
35. Id. at 1291. Justice Blackmun recognized that in most situations a finding that the
seller's lower price was offered in good faith to meet a competitor's price could be predi-
cated on facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that an equally low price was available to the
favored purchaser. Id. However, he recognized that in other situations it might be apparent
that the defendant's low offer was not made in good faith, despite the availability of a low
price from another seller. Id. See F. RowE, supra note 22, at 234-35. See generally Kuenzel
& Schiffres, Making Sense of Robinson-Patman: The Need to Revitalize Its Affirmative
Defense, 62 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1237-55 (1976).
36. 324 U.S. 746 (1945). In Staley the FTC instituted an action against Staley and six
competing manufacturers of glucose, all adherents to the same Chicago basing-point pricing
system. 103 S. Ct. at 1291. See C. EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAW 372-79 (1959);
FTC Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 3601.27,
3601.40-42 (1959). Staley sold glucose to candy and syrup manufacturers from its plant in
Decatur, Illinois at a delivered price that included the freight rate from Chicago to the point
of delivery. Staley's customers located near its Decatur plant were harmed because they
were charged an element of "phantom freight." Staley absorbed an element of freight in
sales to buyers nearer Chicago. 103 S. Ct. at 1291. See 324 U.S. at 749, 756. At the time
Staley and the other manufacturers were charged with price discrimination and price fixing,
the FTC and the Supreme Court were in agreement that the pricing system used by Staley's
competitors was illegal under § 2(a). 103 S. Ct. at 1291-92. See 324 U.S. at 756.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 1292. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
454 (1978) (quoting Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963)). In Continental
Baking, the Commission defined the standard for a "good faith response" as follows:
At the heart of Section 2(b) is the concept of "good faith." This is a flexible and
pragmatic, not a technical or doctrinaire, concept. The standard of good faith is sim-
ply the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably
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and Vanco Beverage differed markedly from those present in
Staley. 8
Justice Blackmun noted that the district court characterized as
"artificially high" the Indiana prices charged by Falls City and its
competitors.3 9 He determined, however, there was no evidence that
Falls City was involved in a plan to obtain artificially high profits
through lower prices in Kentucky or that Falls City adopted a sys-
tem of prices maintained by competitors as the defendant in Sta-
ley had.40 In other words, Justice Blackmun declined to attribute
Falls City's lower prices in Kentucky to an illegal scheme to raise
prices in Indiana.4' He then repeated the crucial issue which the
district court did not address having found that Falls City's Indi-
ana prices rose in response to its competitor's Indiana prices,
namely, whether Falls City's Kentucky prices remained lower in
response to its competitor's Kentucky prices.4
Recognizing the appeal of Vanco's argument that tacit or explicit
collusion or market power is not consistent with a good faith re-
sponse, given industry-wide price discrimination within a single ge-
ographic retail market, Justice Blackmun determined that a seller
is required to justify only its lower price by the terms of the sec-
tion 2(b) meeting competition defense.4 Although a remedy for
collusive price setting exists under the Sherman Act," Justice
Blackmun stated that collusion is relevant to Vanco's Robinson-
Patman claim only if Falls City's lower Kentucky price was af-
fected by it.4 5
Although Justice Blackmun found that industry-wide price dis-
crimination within a geographic market should signal to a court
that a substantial possibility of collusion exists,4' he maintained
believes is a situation of competitive necessity.
Id.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 1292. See supra note 36.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Justice Blackmun recognized that Vanco, except in its rejected Sherman Act
claim, did not attempt to prove that the prices Falls City claimed to have met were illegal or
that Falls City, in meeting those prices, knew them to be illegal. Id. n.9. Had such an issue
been raised, the plaintiff would have had the burden of proving that the prices met were
illegal. Id. See, e.g., Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); National
Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968);
see Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 and n.7 (5th Cir. 1956).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 1292.
43. Id. See FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 753.
44. See supre note 11.
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1292.
46. Id. at 1293. Justice Blackmun, citing FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 715
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Vanco's argument foundered for another reason - absence of
proof.4 7 He noted extensive state regulation of the sale of beer4" to
explain the persistent interstate price difference.4 '9 To support his
conclusion that sustained price discrimination did not demonstrate
Falls City's Kentucky prices were not a good faith response to
competition and that separate pricing structures may well have de-
veloped in Indiana and Kentucky without collusion, Justice Black-
mun cited the direct price competition between wholesalers in
Henderson County and wholesalers in adjacent Kentucky
counties.6 0
Justice Blackmun next addressed two factors relied on by the
court of appeals in rejecting Falls City's meeting competition de-
fense: (1) price discrimination was created by raising rather than
lowering prices; and (2) Falls City, in order to increase its profits,
raised its prices.6 ' He found neither of these factors to be decisive
because section 2(b) does not require a seller to lower its price to
meet competition;2 it only requires a showing by the defendant
that it reasonably believed that an equally low price was available
to the purchaser and that it offered the lower price based on that
belief.8
Justice Blackmun asserted that a contrary rule would contravene
(1948), where the multiple basing point system of delivered prices employed by respondents
could only have been maintained through collusion and in contravention of economic princi-
ples, and Staley, 324 U.S. at 756, where the Court found the basing point system was
adopted to establish artificially high prices not to meet competitor's equally low prices,
noted persistent industry-wide price discrimination may only be explained, in some cases,
by collusion. 103 S. Ct. at 1293 n.10. See generally Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1578-79 (1969). Justice Blackmun
defined "economic" price discrimination as "selling a product to different customers at
prices that bear different ratios to the marginal costs of sales to those customers .... " 103
S. Ct. at 1293 n.10. Then he repeated the court's definition of price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act, formulated in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549
(1960), as "merely a price difference." Id. In Anheuser-Busch, the defendant appealed from
an FTC cease and desist order issued on the ground that it had lowered prices in one mar-
ket without making similar price reductions in other markets, thereby violating § 2(a) of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Id.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 1293.
48. See supra notes 5-8.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 1293.
50. Id. Justice Blackmun found this unusual circumstance may have resulted in the
prices charged to Vanco and other wholesalers in Vanderburgh County being more affected
by market conditions in northern Indiana cities, such as Gary and Fort Wayne, than by
conditions in Henderson County, Kentucky, just across the state line. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. According to Justice Blackmun, "the seller is not required to show that the
difference resulted from subtraction rather than addition." Id.
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the express language of the statute, and there would be a possibil-
ity that legitimate competition might be stifled. 5" This would be
particularly likely to happen, according to Justice Blackmun, in
periods of generally rising prices.55 In such circumstances, vigorous
competition might take the form of small price increases as op-
posed to price cuts.56
Additionally, Justice Blackmun refused to countenance the idea
that good faith is negated when prices responsive to competitors'
prices are raised to increase the seller's profits.5 7 Justice Blackmun,
quoting the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC,58 indicated that to retain a customer, a seller is not required
to lower its price to all its customers to avail itself of the good faith
meeting competition defense. 9 Conversely, he stated section 2(b)
does not require a seller to freeze his price to his other customers
to retain one by meeting the price offered to that customer by a
competitor, so long as the seller acts in good faith.60
Elaborating further on what the section 2(b) defense does not
require, Justice Blackmun concluded that a seller need not sacri-
fice profits that would otherwise be available through sales to its
remaining customers in meeting, in good faith, a competitor's lower
price to certain customers.61 Since the purpose of section 2(b) is to
permit the seller to respond to different competitive situations
flexibly, Justice Blackmun stated that a prudent businessman





58. 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951). In Standard Oil, the FTC brought an action under the
Robinson-Patman Act challenging the Standard Oil Company's right to sell gasoline to four
comparatively large jobbers in Detroit at a lower price per gallon than it sold like gasoline to
many comparatively smaller service station customers. Standard Oil raised the meeting
competition defense claiming it was a complete substantive defense to the charge. The
Court held the lower price was justified if it was made to retain each jobber as a customer
and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. 340 U.S. at 234. The Stan-
dard Oil Court determined that a seller need not choose between "ruinously cutting its
prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one,. . . [and]. . . refusing to meet
the competition and then ruinously raising its prices to its remaining customers to cover
increased unit costs." Id. at 250. Justice Blackmun added: "Nor need a seller choose be-
tween keeping all its prices ruinously low to meet the price offered to one, and ruinously
raising its prices to all customers to a level significantly above that charged by its competi-
tors." 103 S. Ct. at 1294.





meeting a competitor's price with an equally low price with respect
to others so long as the response was made in good faith to a situa-
tion of competitive necessity. 2
Noting that the Supreme Court in Staley was not concerned
with a seller whose normal, non-discriminatory pricing method
called for a price increase, Justice Blackmun overruled the court of
appeals' position that prices cannot be selectively raised. 3 He sub-
mitted that the circuit court's position was nonsensical because a
seller who desired to exempt certain customers from an increase in
response to competitors' prices to those customers could achieve
the identical result by instituting across the board price increases
followed by selective price reductions." Justice Blackmun ruled in-
stead that section 2(b) called for a pragmatic approach to permit
selective price increases and eliminate wasteful economic
transactions.6 5
Justice Blackmun, having addressed the court of appeals' con-
tention that price discrimination resulting from raising prices pre-
cluded exoneration under the section 2(b) meeting competition de-
fense, turned next to Vanco's argument that the section 2(b)
defense was not available to Falls City because the price discrimi-
nation it engaged in was not a defensive response to competition.66
According to Justice Blackmun, Vanco argued that a defensive re-
sponse is mandated by section 2(b) - price discrimination is per-
mitted only if it is necessary to retain a customer.6 7 Justice Black-
mun then explained what defensive means in the context of section
2(b): "the lower price must be calculated and offered in good faith
to 'meet not beat' a competitor's low price."6 8 Section 2(b) does not
distinguish between a seller who meets a competitor's lower price
to retain an old customer and one who meets a competitor's lower




65. Id. To support his position, Justice Blackmun quoted as follows from the Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 182 (1955):
" 'Section 2(b) should not require proof that the seller departed from a previously uniform
price schedule. Such previous pricing is not relevant to evaluation of genuine responses to a
current competitive situation.'" 103 S. Ct. at 1294 n.11 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 1294.
67. Id.
68. Id. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 454 (1978).
69. 103 S. Ct. at 1294. See Stevens, Defense of Meeting the Lower Price of Competi-
tor, Lectures on Federal Antitrust Laws 129, 135-36 (1953). Justice Blackmun noted that
three courts of appeals have held that the defense is not limited to attempts to retain cus-
Vol. 22:207
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said, would be inconsistent with the statutory language and pur-
pose of promoting competition ° and would artificially constrict
and protect commercial relationships from natural market forces.7
1
Justice Blackmun next took issue with the court of appeals' reli-
ance on Staley to disqualify Falls City from raising the meeting
competition defense because it established its prices on a statewide
basis and not on a customer-by-customer basis. 72 Noting conflict-
ing holdings among circuits addressing this issue, Justice Black-
mun held there was no evidence of congressional intent to reserve
the availability of the meeting competition defense for customer-
specific responses only or to preclude territorial price differences
that are responsive to competitive conditions.74  Rather, where
competitive conditions warrant them, Congress intended to permit
tomers. Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 387 and n.3 (9th Cir. 1974); Hanson v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1136 (1974); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1962). But see
Standard Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 (1959), wherein the defense was held to be available only if the lower price was respon-
sive to individual competitive demands. 103 S. Ct. at 1294 n.12.
70. Id. at 1295. See Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1962).
In Sunshine Biscuits, the court of appeals reviewed a cease and desist order by the FTC
and held the meeting competition defense permitted a manufacturer to grant discounts to
certain customers equal to those of its competitors in order to retain them. Further, the
manufacturer could grant similar discounts to certain purchasers who up to then were not
its customers in order to obtain them as customers. Id.
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1295. Justice Blackmun referred to the policy perspectives outlined in
the report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws and
the 1977 Report, supra note 26. 103 S. Ct. at 1295. Also distinguishing the Court's holding
in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), he contended the framing of petitioner's
defense explained the Standard Oil Court's reference to the defense being available to a
seller seeking to retain a customer. 103 S. Ct. at 1295 n.13. See 340 U.S. at 250.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 1295.
73. Compare Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 959 (1966) (customer-by-customer response required), and
Standard Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 (1959) (same), with William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IIT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1046 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982) (customer-by-cus-
tomer response not necessarily required), Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 442 (5th
Cir. 1966) (same), and Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956) (same). 103 S. Ct. at 1295 n.14.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 1295. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act, the forerunner of § 2(b),
was quoted by Justice Blackmun: "nothing herein contained shall prevent ... discrimina-
tion in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition."
Id. Justice Blackmun also referred to the Report of the House Judiciary Committee to ex-
plain the foundation of § 2(b): "It should be noted that while the seller is permitted to meet
local competitors, [§ 2(b)] does not permit him to cut local prices until his competitor has
first offered lower prices, and then he can go no further than to meet those prices." H.R.
REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936) (emphasis supplied). See Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247-48 n.14 (1951). 103 S. Ct. at 1295.
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fair pricing responses on an area-specific basis, and to allow terri-
torial price differences that are in fact responses to competitive
conditions.
Expanding upon this holding, Justice Blackmun concluded that
a seller may extend a single low price to numerous purchasers,
given a reasonable belief that the seller's competitors have made
their lower price available to those purchasers.7 1 Justice Blackmun
based his decision on the specific language of section 2(b) which
permits a lower price to be offered to "any purchaser or purchas-
ers" 7" if it is made in good faith to meet a competitor's equally low
price. The Court concluded that beyond the imperative that the
lower price be reasonably formulated to meet not beat competi-
tion, it was a factual question whether the manner in which com-
petition was met was within the parameters allowed by Congress.7 '
Justice Blackmun clarified the Court's position with respect to
75. 103 S. Ct. at 1295. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1950) wherein
the Court concluded the purpose of § 2(a) was to "restric[t] the proviso to price differentials
occurring in actual competition."
76. 103 S. Ct. at 1295-96.
77. Id. at 1295. See supra note 12.
78. 103 S. Ct. 1296.
79. Id. See 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936). Justice Blackmun said there are circumstances
in which it would be reasonable for a seller to conclude that his competitor or competitors
were charging lower prices in a particular area. 103 S. Ct. at 1296. See William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1046 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57, 58 (1982); Balian Ice Cream Co.v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); F. RowE, supra note 22, at 235-36. See also
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247 n.13 (1951), from which Justice Blackmun
quoted Herbert A. Bergson, Assistant Attorney General, at Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: "The section presently per-
mits seller to justify otherwise forbidden price discriminations on the ground that the lower
prices to one set of buyers were made in good faith to meet the equally low prices of a
competitor." 103 S. Ct. at 1296 n.15 (emphasis supplied). Justice Blackmun added to re-
quire customer-by-customer negotiations would be futile and ruinously expensive for
smaller businesses such as Falls City attempting to compete with larger national firms be-
cause it is unlikely that such negotiations would result in prices different from those estab-
lished with information obtained about competitors' territorial prices. 103 S. Ct. at 1296. Cf.
Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1966) (requirement of customer-by-
customer pricing would be unreasonable in some circumstances). Justice Blackmun recog-
nized that the court in Staley, as well as in later cases, has contrasted "general systems of
competition" with "individual competitive situations." 103 S. Ct. at 1296. He explained that
these references to sellers' lower prices were the result of their being unresponsive to rivals'
prices due to preconceived pricing scales effective regardless of any fluctuations in competi-
tors' prices and not because of their being responsive to the lower prices of competitors. Id.
Further, he found ample support for this view of territorial pricing in the following sources:
(1) F. RowE, supra note 22, at 240; Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 7i6, 719 (4th Cir.
1957); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 301 (1957); C. E. Neihoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114,
1130, 1146 (1955). 103 S. Ct. 1296 n.16.
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territorial pricing by noting that a seller must restrict its lower
price to those customers whom it reasonably believes have been
offered a lower price by competitors.8" An unreasonably tailored
response or one based on inadequate corroboration would negate a
finding of good faith.81 Justice Blackmun indicated that the section
2(b) defense would be established by a seller choosing territorial
pricing over customer-by-customer negotiations by showing that a
reasonable and prudent businessman would believe that the lower
price he charged was generally in force throughout the area of
competition and throughout the time period when he made it
available.82
On behalf of the majority, Justice Blackmun refused, in the ab-
sence of further findings, to hold that Falls City established its
meeting competition defense since neither the district court nor
the court of appeals had decided whether Falls City had shown
facts that would have led a reasonable and prudent person to con-
clude that its lower Kentucky price would meet an equally low
price of competitors.8" He also concluded that an improper stan-
dard had been applied to the issue of whether Falls City's single,
statewide Kentucky price was set in good faith and as a well tai-
lored response to the competitive situation there."
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1296.
81. Id. at 1296-97. Justice Blackmun indicated that the response may continue only as
long as the competitive circumstances that warranted it in the first place continue and are
reasonably known to the seller. Id. at 1297. See Klein, Meeting Competition by Price Sys-
tems under § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Problems and Prospects, 16 ANrrrusTr
BULL. 213, 233-34 (1971); Kuenzel & Schiffres, 62 VA. L. Rav. at 1244-49 (1976). Justice
Blackmun placed the burden on the seller choosing territorial pricing to demonstrate the
decision was a reasonable response to the existing competitive situation. 103 S. Ct. at 1297.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 1297. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Bak-
ing Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57-58 (1982). Id.
83. 103 S. Ct. at 1297.
84. Id. Although Justice Blackmun declined to decide whether Falls City reasonably
believed its low prices were available to Dawson Springs and other Kentucky wholesalers
from Falls City's competitors, he noted even if such a finding were made, Falls City could
not necessarily eliminate price discrimination between Vanco and Dawson Springs. Id. n.18.
Justice Blackmun demonstrated an understanding of Falls City's untenable economic posi-
tion: if it raised its Kentucky prices at the same time it raised its Indiana prices, it would
lose sales in Kentucky. Furthermore, if Falls City only raised its prices in Henderson
County, it would lose sales there and open itself up to a new Robinson-Patman Act claim
since Dawson Springs competed with wholesalers in neighboring Kentucky counties. Any
adjustment to Falls City's price to Vanco to conform with the lower Kentucky price would
be impractical since Indiana law mandated simultaneously offering the same price to all
Indiana wholesalers, a response which would have financially harmed Falls City since most
of its sales were in areas far removed from Kentucky prices and competition. He then noted
that the burden of establishing the defense rested on Falls City and the fact that Vanco did
not allege facts to the contrary was not determinative in deciding whether Falls City met its
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A proper understanding of the Falls City decision and, indeed,
any Robinson-Patman case depends upon an understanding of
conditions and events which led to the enactment of the Robinson-
Patman Act in 1936. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the
conventional system of distribution for American business involved
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, each with distinct func-
tions. Following World War I, this clear cut distribution channel
was interrupted by the growth of grocery chains and mail order
merchandisers. Retailing and wholesaling functions were inte-
grated by chain stores to yield a successful combination of opera-
tional efficiencies and bargaining tactics which permitted lower
prices to be passed on to consumers. Naturally, independent retail-
ers were adversely affected by these developments."'
Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the businesses of independent
retailers suffered a mortality rate that averaged ten percent per
year despite their organized efforts to engage in economic warfare
against chain stores.8s The Clayton Act proved to be inadequate to
deter the concessions obtained from manufacturers by chain buy-
ers in competition with independent retailers.8s Spurred by the
Great Depression, independent merchants mounted a drive for leg-
islative relief which culminated in the Robinson-Patman Act
amendment to the Clayton Act."8 As a preliminary step to legisla-
tive action, the Federal Trade Commission conducted a lengthy in-
vestigation and recommended that section 2 of the Clayton Act be
amended to prohibit unfair or unjust discriminations in price be-
tween different purchasers.8 9
The prototype of the Robinson-Patman Act was then drafted by
H. B. Teegarden, counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers
burden. Justice Blackmun hinted that the record contained evidence which might support
findings favorable to Falls City but determined drawing such inferences from the evidence
was for a jury. Id.
85. See generally F. RowE, supra note 22, at 3-5 and ABA Antitrust Section, Mono-
graph No. 4, supra note 26, at 8-10.
86. F. RowE, supra note 22, at 5.
87. Id. at 6-7. The Clayton Act was ineffective for three reasons: (1) § 2 of the Clayton
Act was directed at the predatory tactics of national trusts which slashed prices in selected
localities to eliminate or discipline competition; (2) courts emasculated the law's provisions
by interpreting it to apply to competition at the buyer level only until 1929; and (3) the
statute itself exempted price differentials "on account of differences in grade, quantity or
quality of the commodity sold." Id.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 9. See FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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Association.9" On June 11, 1935, Representative Patman, who
chaired a special committee investigating the American Retail Fed-
eration, introduced the bill, which went beyond the FTC recom-
mendations and eliminated the meeting competition defense.9
The House Judiciary Committee reported the Patman bill favor-
ably on March 31, 1936, but reinstated a narrower version of the
meeting competition provision of the original Clayton Act to per-
mit a seller's meeting in good faith a competitor's equally low
price. 92 The Senate meanwhile had approved the Robinson bill, the
companion bill to the House bill, which contained a meeting com-
petition provision coextensive with the provision in the original
Clayton Act, and various other weakening amendments.93
The House eventually passed the Patman bill two hundred
ninety votes to sixteen votes9" and on June 1, 1936 the Senate sent
the matter to conference by voting to approve the Patman bill as
amended by the Robinson bill which by then included revisions
accepted during Senate debate.9 5 The Senate-House conferees rec-
onciled the Senate and House versions, discarding all weakening
limitations adopted on the Senate floor." Futhermore, the nar-
rower House version of the meeting competition defense pre-
vailed.91 The Conference Report was accepted by the House on
June 15 and by the Senate on June 18, thus permitting the Presi-
dent to sign the Robinson-Patman Act into law on June 19, 1936.8
The Robinson-Patman Act has been characterized as the most
complex and controversial of the antitrust laws and as a master-
piece of obscurity.99 Representative Celler, one of the few House
90. F. Rows, supra note 22, at 11-12.
91. Id. at 12. The companion bill to H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Seas. (1935) was S.
3154, 74th Cong., 1st Seas. (1935), introduced by Senator Robinson. Like the Patman bill, it
went beyond the recommendations of the Federal Trade Commission. In general terms, the
bills unconditionally banned discriminations in price or terms of sale in interstate com-
merce, and eliminated the requirement of an effect on competition, as opposed to an effect
on a competitor, and the good faith meeting competition defense contained in the original
Clayton Act. Id. at 17-18. See supra note 74 for text of the meeting competition proviso in
the original Clayton Act. See infra text accompanying note 92.
92. Id. at 16-17. The House debated the Patman bill between May 21 and May 28,
1936 following the Senate's consideration of the Robinson bill between April 28 and April
30, 1936. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 17-18.
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at ix-xiii and 19.
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members opposed to the Act, decried what emerged from the legis-
lative debates as a "hodgepodge" which "contains many inconsis-
tencies, and the courts will have the devil's own job to unravel the
tangle."100 His view was shared by Mr. Justice Jackson, who, dis-
senting in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,101 lamented the vague generalities
of the Act and the fact that in it "nothing is commanded to be




Complicating the language employed in the Act itself are con-
flicting public policies surrounding its enforcement.1 3 Viewed al-
ternatively as the Magna Carta of small business and a roadblock
in the way of effective competition and consumers' benefits, the
ambiguities of sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Act have been ad-
dressed repeatedly by the Supreme Court. 1' 4
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act which proscribes price
discrimination when its effect "may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,"105
has been the subject of extensive judicial review. Courts have in-
terpreted the so-called competitive effects clauses to reach price
discriminations in their incipiency before competition is harmed.0'0
However, the threat of harm must be substantial, and in a private
damage suit the plaintiff must show actual damage to its busi-
ness.1 07 Additionally, courts have determined that these threatened
effects may be at the seller level (primary line), at the buyer level
(secondary line), or at the customers of customers level or custom-
ers of customers of customers level (third and fourth lines
respectively). 08
The majority of Section 2(a) Robinson-Patman cases involve in-
100. Id. at 20. See 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
101. 343 U.S 470 (1952).
102. Id. at 483.
103. An example of these conflicting policies is evident from the following statement
in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951): "Congress was dealing with competi-
tion, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." Id. Clearly,
these aims require a delicate balancing since rigorous prevention of monopoly could stifle
competition and lead to price rigidity, while protecting competition without any checks
could lead to price wars with small local businesses the losers.
104. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, supra note 26, at 1-4.
105. See supra note 10.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1288.
107. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 396 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 860 (1968).
108. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, supra
note 26, at 73.
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jury to secondary line competition, i.e., competition between the
favored and disfavored customers of the price discriminator.' 0 ' The
leading case involving secondary line competition is FTC v. Mor-
ton Salt Co.," 0 which was relied upon by the Supreme Court in
Falls City."' Morton Salt had sold table salt under two standard
quantity discount systems which provided discounts to carload
purchasers and higher discounts to larger volume purchasers."11
Only five large retail food chains qualified for the maximum dis-
count." 3  The Supreme Court in Morton Salt noted that
"[t]heoretically, these discounts are equally available to all, but
functionally they are not" and concluded that the legislative his-
tory made it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an
evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a
small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing
ability."
4
The Morton Salt holding has been interpreted as permitting an
inference of injury applicable to systematic and sustained price
discrimination in the sale of products for resale where the discrimi-
nations are significant. 6 Criticism surrounding this inference of
injury has focused on complaints aimed at small businesses instead
of large buyers, a point raised by Falls City, and the conclusive
effect given the inference of injury despite rebuttal evidence rais-
ing contrary inferences."
The section 2(b) meeting competition defense has engendered
confusion and conflict since its inception as well, having been omit-
ted from initial legislative proposals leading to passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act as "one of the obstacles to enforcement of
the present (1914) Clayton Act.""' 7 The meaning of the meeting
competition defense that was finally included was unclear, how-
ever, since under the original Act the defense provision was so
strictly construed that there are no reported cases in which a seller
109. Id. at 97.
110. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
111. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, supra note 26, at 98.
112. 334 U.S. 37. See also supra notes 25 and 27.
113. Id. at 41.
114. Id. at 42-43.
115. E.g., Foremost Dairies Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 678-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956), affd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
116. ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, supra note 26, at 100-01.




The first major conflict respecting the defense was over its sub-
stantive versus procedural nature. Despite a prevalent understand-
ing of the section 2(b) provision as a complete rebuttal of a price
discrimination charge, the FTC challenged this status in Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC."' The FTC took the view, which has some support
in the legislative history, 20 that section 2(b) was simply a rule of
evidence which allowed a respondent to rebut a prima facie case
under section 2(a), and that such a rebuttal was vitiated when the
Commission introduced additional affirmative evidence of injurious
competitive effects.' 2 ' The Standard Oil Court concluded that
"Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to
abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would
have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a
competitor," and held the defense was absolute.'22
Although the 1951 Standard Oil decision established section
2(b) as an absolute defense, courts still had significant problems
interpreting it. In particular, criteria for determining the factual
sufficiency of the defense remained unclear respecting (1) the legal-
ity of the competitive price met, (2) defensive pricing where old
customers are retained versus aggressive pricing where new cus-
tomers are gained as well as old ones retained, and (3) the adop-
tion of pricing systems versus customer-by-customer responses to
competitive situations.
2 8
Specifically, the legislative history'2 4 and dicta in Staley and
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC engendered the debate as to whether the
price met must be a lawful price. 2 5 In Staley, the respondent ar-
gued that its basing point delivered price system was justified be-
cause other competitors were violating the law by maintaining an
identical system. '2 The Court found this argument "startling" but
118. 5 VON KALINOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, 632.02[1J[a] n.10.
119. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
120. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
121. 340 U.S. at 238-39.
122. 340 U.S. at 250. Three justices dissented, relying on the Conference Committee
report and the remarks of Representative Utterback. See H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-7 (1936) and 80 CONG. Rc 9418 (1936), wherein Representative Utterback de-
clared: "[T]his does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar to a charge of
discrimination under the bill. It merely permits it to be shown in evidence. This provision is
entirely procedural."
123. See generally F. RowE, supra note 22, at 220.
124. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utterback).
125. See generally Annot., 59 L. Ed.2d 810-43 (1979).
126. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
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found that section 2(b) "speaks only of the seller's 'lower' price
and of that only to the extent that it is made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor. ' 12 7 Since Staley adhered to
what was found to be an illegal industry-wide policy of establishing
prices that were not responsive to normal competitive forces, but
designed to exact artificially high prices throughout the country,
the Court held Staley was foreclosed from establishing it was meet-
ing competition in good faith.1 28 The Staley Court's statement that
Congress did not intend to sanction by section 2(b) the excuse that
a person charged with a violation of the law was merely adopting a
similarly unlawful practice of another has been taken to mean that
meeting an unlawful price precludes reliance on section 2(b) even
where judicially determined illegal territorial pricing was absent.
1 29
Likewise, in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, the Court frequently
spoke of "lawful" prices. For example, the Court stated, "under the
Robinson-Patman Act, it is a complete defense to a charge of price
discrimination for the seller to show its price differential has been
made in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a
competitor."1 30 However, the question of lawfulness was not before
the court in Standard Oil.
As distinct from customer-by-customer responses to individual
competitive situations, section 2(b) has been construed by some
courts to preclude territorial pricing systems and by others to per-
mit adoption of territorial pricing systems, whether or not the sys-
tems are actually or inherently unlawful."'1 Again, Staley provides
guidance, albeit in the context of an industry-wide basing point
system, since the Supreme Court stated that section 2(b) empha-
sized individual competitive situations rather than a general sys-
tem of competition.' 2
The section 2(b) defense has also engendered controversy as to
whether only defensive price quotations constitute meeting a com-
petitor's lower price in good faith.1 3  The retention of existing cus-
tomers versus the capture of new ones has been considered a re-
vealing if not determinative circumstance in this regard.
1 4
127. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976)).
128. 324 U.S. at 754.
129. Id. at 753-54. See generally, Annot., 59 L. Ed.2d 810-43 (1979).
130. 340 U.S. at 246 (emphasis supplied).
131. See supra note 73.
132. 324 U.S. at 753.
133. See supra note 69.
134. See F. RowE, supra note 22, at 245.
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According to the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, section 2(b)
was "limited to a price reduction made to meet in good faith an
equally low price of a competitor."135 This reference was held to
mean that section 2(b) authorizes only the retention of a seller's
current accounts, despite the fact that condemning the incidental
securing of new customers or the regaining of lost accounts from a
genuinely defensive reaction would thwart competition.1 6
In Falls City, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
court of appeals' holdings with respect to the injury to competition
requirement of section 2(a) of the Act and the meeting competition
defense provided by section 2(b). The Falls City Court reaffirmed
and clarified existing law under section 2(a) (i.e., section 2(a) only
requires a reasonable possibility that a price discrimination may
harm competition). More significantly, the Court resolved conflicts
among the circuits respecting the interpretation of section 2(b) and
promoted a flexible and pragmatic approach to section 2(b) issues
advocated in earlier decisions, noting "[tihe very purpose of the
defense is to permit a seller to treat different competitive situa-
tions differently.'
' 7
Since the district court's findings regarding price discrimination
were amply supported by direct evidence of diverted sales,138 the
importance of the Falls City decision respecting injury to competi-
tion lies in its support for permitting the inference of harm to com-
petition from proof of a "substantial price discrimination between
competing purchasers over time," despite the absence of a large
buyer in the market place.' 39 The Court refused Falls City's invita-
tion to limit such an inference to situations involving large buyer
preference or seller predation, suggesting that to do so would in-
volve economic policy considerations within the purview of Con-
gress not the Court. Additionally, in line with its refusal to limit
the Morton Salt rule, the Court adopted Justice White's position
respecting causation in his concurring opinion in Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.14 0 There Justice White
found that a causative link between harm to competition and dam-
135. 340 U.S. at 241.
136. See, e.g., Standard Motor Products Corp. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 674 (1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 48
(7th Cir. 1962).
137. 103 S. Ct. at 1294.
138. See id. at 1290. See supra note 30.
139. This constitutes the so-called Morton Salt rule. See supra notes 21-27 and ac-
companying text.
140. 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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ages under section 4141 is established when the plaintiff shows the
defendant substantially contributed to its injury, notwithstanding
the presence of other factors. 42
The Supreme Court's holding in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC that
the meeting competition defense is an absolute one, as well as the
prudent person standard enunciated by the Court in Staley were
part of the foundation upon which the Court structured its deci-
sion in Falls City. Nevertheless, before remanding the case to the
court of appeals for resolving the issue of whether Falls City had
shown information that would have led a reasonable and prudent
businessman to believe that its lower Kentucky price would meet
competitors' equally low price there, the Court circumscribed the
court of appeals' extension of Staley while reiterating the flexible
and pragmatic facts and circumstances oriented approach taken by
the Court in United States v. United States Gypsum.4"
Because of absence of evidence that Falls City's lower prices in
Kentucky were established as part of a plan to obtain high profits
in Indiana, the Court had no difficulty distinguishing the case from
Staley since Staley "had been found to be a party to an inter-seller
conspiracy aimed at maintaining an 'oppressive and uniform net
delivered price throughout the country.' ",4 Thus, Vanco's at-
tempt to analogize the case to Staley foundered. 4 5 Given the exis-
tence of extensive state regulations, 46 and the absence of collusion,
the Court determined that sustained price discrimination is not an
automatic bar to finding a good faith response to competition, thus
clearing the way for further criticism of the court of appeals' heavy
reliance on Staley.'47 The Court considered unfounded the court of
141. See supra note 19.
142. 392 U.S. 134, 143-44 (White, J., concrring). Justice White relied on the following
cases: Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Haverhill
Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964);
Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 967 (1949).
143. 438 U.S. 422, 454 (1978). The Court in United States Gypsum addressed the
issue of whether verification through the exchange of price information between sellers for
purposes of § 2(b) was exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny. Holding that the exchange of
information for § 2(b) purposes was not required by the Robinson-Patman Act and would
not preclude criminal liability for price fixing, the Court emphasized that good faith rather
than absolute certainty was the hallmark of the defense, and suggested that a seller could
assert the defense if he unknowingly made a bid which beat rather than met competition.
Id.
144. 103 S. Ct. at 1291.
145. Id. at 1292.
146. See supra notes 5-8.
147. 103 S. Ct. at 1293.
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appeals' use of Staley as precedent to distinguish between raising
prices to meet competition and to increase profits and lowering
prices to meet competition. Because Staley involved a presupposi-
tion that prices be reduced in order to meet the competitor's
equally low price, it was not dispositive on the issue of whether
raising prices negated reliance on section 2(b)."8
Therefore, the significance of the Falls City case lies in the fact
that the Court definitively resolved two issues that have generated
conflict among the circuits: (1) whether the meeting competition
defense is available when a seller meets a competitor's lower price
in an attempt to gain new customers as opposed to simply at-
tempting to retain old customers; and (2) whether the defense is
available to sellers pricing on other than a customer-by-customer
basis.
In concluding that section 2(b) does not distinguish between
meeting competition to retain a customer or meeting competition
to gain a new one, the Court essentially adopted the rationale of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v.
FTC." 9 The seller in Sunshine Biscuits, a vendor of potato chips
who had granted five percent volume discounts and two percent
cash discounts to nineteen large retail grocery and drugstore chains
in Cleveland, retained its old customers and gained new ones as a
result of its response to sharp competition in the Cleveland area.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC because the seller had reduced prices only to retain
customers, not to obtain new ones, leaving the issue unresolved by
the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Standard Motor Products Corp. v. FTC because
it contended the Second Circuit misapplied the holding of Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. FTC."0
While the Supreme Court in Falls City did not find, as did the
Seventh Circuit in Sunshine Biscuits, that the legislative history
was inconclusive, the Court expressed the view that a contrary
holding would be economically unsound and anticompetitive. Like-
wise, the Seventh Circuit determined that a refusal to permit sell-
ers to raise the section 2(b) defense after obtaining new customers
in response to competition would give an established seller a mo-
nopoly of his own purchasers and prohibit other sellers from enter-
148. Id. at 1294.
149. 306 F.2d 48, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1962).
150. Id. at 51.
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ing the market."'1
With respect to the second issue, the Falls City Court emphati-
cally stated that there was "no evidence that Congress intended to
limit the availability of section 2(b) to customer-specific re-
sponses. '1 5 2 The Court determined that the statutory language and
legislative history supported the approaches adopted by the courts
in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 153 Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, '" and Balian Ice Cream Co. v.
Arden Farms Co.155 wherein sellers were found to have had good
reason to believe their competitors were charging lower prices
throughout a particular region. In the most recent case, Inglis, the
plaintiff, a local bread bakery, was caught in the middle of a price
war involving three national bakeries. Although the defendant, one
of the three national bakeries, did not initiate any of the price re-
ductions and was responding to the price offers of other national
bakeries, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant's fail-
ure to offer price reductions on an individual basis or alternatively
to set up a system to verify the need to institute marketwide re-
ductions raised a factual question for the jury as to the availability
of the section 2(b) defense.1" In short, the Falls City Court laid to
rest the view that meeting competition must be on a customer-by-
customer basis, thereby delimiting the language in Staley to the
effect that "[t]he Act. . .places emphasis on individual competi-
tive situations, rather than upon a general system of
competition.
15 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Falls City with its emphasis on
flexibility and the factual determination of good faith with refer-
ence to the prudent businessman standard heralds resolution of
other issues in conformance with this approach. In particular, the
issue of whether the section 2(b) defense is available to meet un-
lawful as well as lawful prices has not been explicitly resolved by
the Supreme Court, although Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC1" arguably rejects any need for the seller to prove the lawful-
ness of the price met.1 69 In that case, the Court concluded "a seller
151. Id. at 52.
152. 103 S. Ct. at 1295.
153. 668 F.2d 1014, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57-58 (1982).
154. 362 F.2d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1966).
155. 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
156. 668 F.2d at 1045.
157. 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
158. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
159. Id. at 82-83 (1979).
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can assert the defense even if it has unknowingly made a bid that
in fact not only met but beat his competition," if he acted in good
faith."'
Precedent clearly favors the Court's adoption of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's subjective standard enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown'61 wherein the legality of a competitor's price was directly
in issue. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
burden was on the FTC or a private plaintiff to prove that met
prices were illegal and the seller knew or should have known that
his competitor's price was unlawful."' Indeed, in noting that Falls
City did not adopt an illegal system of prices maintained by its
competitors, Justice Blackmun implicitly recognized the validity of
the subjective standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit because he
stated Vanco never attempted to prove that the prices Falls City
met were illegal or that Falls City met them knowing them to be
unlawful.' "
With the Court's decision in Falls City, another advancement
has been made in reducing the ambiguities of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. By reaffirming principles of good faith rather than abso-
lute certainty, the Court has demonstrated its support for protect-
ing competition through a pragmatic and economically sensible
interpretation of the section 2(b) defense.
Marnie M. Crouch
160. Id. at 83.
161. 238 F.2d 54, 58.
162. Id.
163. 103 S.Ct at 1292 n.9.
230 Vol. 22:207
